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A NAVIGATIONAL SYSTEM FOR UNCHARTED
WATERS:
THE LONDON CONVENTION AND LONDON
PROTOCOL'S ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
ON OCEAN IRON FERTILIZATION

I.

OCEAN IRON FERTILIZATION: GATEWAY TO HOPE OR DESTRUCTION ... OR
SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN?

Climate change discourse has sparked ideas and motivated action from local grassroots groups to international organizations.1 Out of this mobilization, scientists and
researchers have produced ideas - some easily practicable, others lofty and imaginative
- to combat climate change.2 Using geoengineering, the process of manipulating the
Earth and its elements, to fight climate change is one such lofty idea; ocean iron
fertilization is a specific example. 3 Ocean iron fertilization is exactly what it sounds like:
scientists select a swath of ocean, formulate a mixture comprised mainly of iron dust,
and fertilize the ocean with it. 4 The iron, in turn, mixes with other nutrients in the water
5
to produce blooms of phytoplankton, a form of marine plant life. The phytoplankton
6
then go to work absorbing carbon dioxide through the process of photosynthesis.
Researchers hypothesize that the carbon dioxide absorbed by the phytoplankton could
actually reduce greenhouse gas pollution. But, like so many ideas that, at the outset,
strike hope and the promise of discovery in the hearts of optimists, ocean iron
fertilization is not without powerful opponents. 8 "[W]e're looking at a state of the world
where we rely on manipulating the ocean on a truly huge scale and that would
undoubtedly have large and possibly irreversible effects on ocean ecosystems,"
Greenpeace has admonished. 9 Professor S.W.A. Navqi, co-chief scientist on the most

1. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
3. Id.
4. Hugh
Powell,
Fertilizing the
Ocean with
Iron, OCEANUS
(Nov.
13,
http://www.whoi.eduloceanus/printArticle.do?id=34167 [hereinafter Powell, Fertilizingthe Ocean].
5. Id.

2007),

6. Id. See also J. Stein Carter, Photosynthesis, BIOLOGY AT CLERMONT COLLEGE, UNIV. OF CINCINNATI,

http://biology.clc.uc.edulCourses/biol04/photosyn.htm (last modified Nov. 2, 2004) (explaining the process of
photosynthesis).
7. Randall S. Abate & Andrew B. Greenlee, Sowing Seeds Uncertain: Ocean Iron Fertilization, Climate
Change,and the InternationalEnvironmentalLaw Framework,27 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 555, 561 (2010).
8. Richard Black, Setback for Climate Technical Fix, BBC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2009, 17:18 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hil7959570.stm.
9. Id.
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recent ocean iron fertilization experiment, LOHAFEX, took a slightly different
perspective: "This is rubbish . . . They are scaring and misleading people." 10

A primary difficulty with ocean iron fertilization lies in the puzzling question of its
legality. 1 1 The 2009 LOHAFEX experiment won permission, lost permission, and
ultimately re-obtained permission from the German government to proceed; this
confusion stemmed from an absence of domestic or international laws regulating ocean
iron fertilization.12 International bodies within the United Nations have started a move
toward regulation of ocean iron fertilization, but no single international legal instrument
speaks directly to, or even analogizes very well to, ocean iron fertilization. 13
The London Convention and London Protocol have established themselves as the
competent international body for the regulation of ocean iron fertilization. The
Contracting Parties to these treaties are moving forward with legally binding options to
bring ocean iron fertilization regulation officially within the purview of the London
Convention and London Protocol. Chief among these regulations is the new Assessment
Framework, which provides tools for evaluating ocean iron fertilization proposals'
promotion of legitimate scientific research. The Contracting Parties' use of the
Assessment Framework will play a significant role in whether ocean iron fertilization
will grow as a field of scientific research and, ultimately, in determining the fate of ocean
iron fertilization as a possible geoengineering strategy. The Assessment Framework is in
its beginning stages and is not without limitations. Nonetheless, it shows substantial
potential to promote global, transparent, and effective regulation of ocean iron
fertilization, and leads the way toward eventually establishing international norms and
standards with regard to ocean iron fertilization.
Part II of this paper presents the process of ocean iron fertilization and its use as a
geoengineering strategy. Part III discusses various treaties whose provisions speak
indirectly to ocean iron fertilization, but fail to regulate it in any practicable manner. Part
III additionally examines the London Convention and London Protocol's measures to
bring ocean iron fertilization within their regulatory scope. Part IV explains the basic
structure of the new Assessment Framework, raises potential concerns, and asks whether
it succeeds in meeting the London Convention and London Protocol's objectives in
regulating ocean iron fertilization. Part IV additionally considers the Assessment
Framework's potential effect on ocean iron fertilization as a geoengineering strategy.
Part V concludes the paper with confidence in the overall utility of the London
Convention and London Protocol's steps in ocean iron fertilization regulation.
II.

A.

CLIMATE CHANGE, GEOENGINEERING, AND OCEAN IRON FERTILIZATION

Geoengineeringas a Climate Change Mitigation Strategy
The Earth is getting warmer at a rate "unparalleled in the last ten thousand

10. Amit Bhattacharya, Antarctic Mission Runs into Protest, TIMES OF INDIA (Jan. 14, 2009, 01:23 IST),
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/3974980.cms?prtpage=l.
11. See Abate & Greenlee, supranote 7.
12. Id. See also Bhattacharya,supranote 10; Black, supra note 8.
13. See Abate & Greenlee, supranote 7.
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years."l4 An authoritative 2007 report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change linked climate change to "the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas
15
concentrations," or pollution caused by human activity. Although this premise has
gained a large consensus within the scientific community, some take the opposing
view.16 Recognizing this ongoing debate, this article assumes the validity of
anthropogenic climate change and the necessity of developing mitigation strategies to
combat it, which an array of institutions has worked to develop.17
Geoengineering is a branch of climate change mitigation strategies that, though
widely unfamiliar, is gaining international importance.18 One basic definition describes
geoengineering as "an intentional, large-scale manipulation of the environment," usually
with the goal of combating climate change. 19 Another less technical, albeit illuminating,
definition asserts that "geoengineering is the study of how to mess with the planet even
more than we already have, with the hope of moving the global climate back in the other
direction."20 Scientists have developed various imaginative geoengineering techniques
with a view toward cooling the planet.21
14. William Daniel Davis, What Does "Green" Mean?: Anthropogenic Climate Change, Geoengineering,
and InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 43 GA. L. REv. 902, 902 (2009).
15. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP 11TO THE
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 9 (M.L. Perry et al.
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), availableat http://www.ipcc.ch/publications and-data/ar4/wg2/en/
contents.html [hereinafter IPCC Report]. The IPCC used the rating of "very likely" to make this claim, which
indicates a probability of 90-99%. Id. at 21. See id. for more on predictions about the effects of climate change.
16. See John M. Broder, Skepticism on Climate Change is Article of Faithfor Tea Party, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
21, 2010, at Al; Climate Change No Threat, Says Czech President, Fox NEWS, Oct. 19, 2010, available at
http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/10/19/climate-change-threat-czech-president-vaclav-klaus; THE ROYAL
SOC'Y, CLIMATE CHANGE: A SUMMARY OF THE SCIENCE (John Pethica et al. eds., 2010), available at
http://royalsociety.org/climate-change-summary-of-science.
17. See, e.g., CAN INTERNATIONAL, http://www.climatenetwork.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2010);
Changement Climatique, MINISTERE DE L'ECOLOGIE, DE L'ENERGIE, DU DEVELOPPEMENT DURABLE ET DE LA
(last visited Oct. 20, 2010);
MER, http://www.stats.environnement.developpement-durable.gouv.fr
GREENPEACE INT'L, http://www.greenpeace.org/intemational (last visited Oct. 20, 2010); UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/2860.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2010);
UNITED STATES GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, http://www.globalchange.gov (last visited Oct. 20,
2010).
18. See DAVID W. KEITH, Engineeringthe Planet,in CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE AND POLICY 494 (Stephen
H. Schneider et al. eds., 2010); Scott Barrett, The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering, ENVTL. &
RESOURCE ECON., Dec. 6, 2007, availableat http://www.springerlink.com/content/a9l294x25wO65vk3/; Ipsos
Mori, Experiment Earth? Public Dialogue on Geoengineering, NAT'L ENvTL RESEARCH COUNCIL (Aug.
2010), available at http://www.nerc.ac.uk/about/consult/geoengineering-dialogue-final-report; David G. Victor
et al., The Geoengineering Option, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2009, at 2, 4, available at
http://chemtrailsnz.co.cc/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/The GeoengineeringOption.pdf.
19. KEITH, supra note 18, at 494; Davis, supra note 14, at 919-20.
20. Chris Mooney, Quick Study: Given Our Worsening Climate Situation, GeoengineeringResearch Makes
Sense, Unfortunately, SCI. PROGRESS (Dec. 3, 2007, 11:07 AM), http://www.scienceprogress.org/
2007/11/quick-study.
21. Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295, 1357 (2009). Another type of
geoengineering involves "albedo modification," or increasing Earth's reflectivity. See Paul Crutzen, Albedo
Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: A Contribution to Resolve a Policy Dilemma?, CLIMATIC
CHANGE, August 2006, available at http://climateresponsefund.org/index.php?option=com content&view
=article&id= 107:crutzen-2006-albedo-enhancement-by-stratospheric-sulfur-injections-a-contribution-toresolve-a-policy-dilemma&catid=39:reference&Itemid=64; John Latham, Global Temperature Stabilization
2
via CloudSeeding, PLANET NETWORK (April 2008), http://www.planetwork.net/climate/cooling/Global% 0
Warming,
Cooling%204-08.pdf; Andrew Moseman, How Geoengineering Works: 5 Big Plans to Stop Global
4 2 90 08 4
; Andy
POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/
Ridgwell et al., Tackling Regional Climate Change by LeafAlbedo Bio-geoengineering, CURRENT BIOLOGY,
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One type of geoengineering cools the Earth by drawing down CO 2 from the
atmosphere, thus allowing more heat to escape the planet.22 The United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change aptly refers to this as a carbon "sink." 23
These techniques aim to store the sunken CO 2 in a solid form that, theoretically, would
keep it from escaping back into the atmosphere forever, or at least for a few centuries. 24
This process, which scientists call carbon sequestration, "remov[es] carbon from the
atmosphere and deposit[s] it in a reservoir."25 Natural reservoirs have existed since the
dawn of time and include trees, oceans, and soil, all of which naturally absorb CO 2.2 6
Artificial reservoirs, on the other hand, have been around since the dawn of the 1990s,
when engineers began developing the means to store CO 2 in new spaces deep
underground, particularly in the seabed.27 Ocean iron fertilization produces a carbon sink
and is a form of carbon sequestration.28
Despite its purported potential to contribute to the fight against climate change,
geoengineering remains embroiled in controversy. Proponents favor continuing research
as it may reveal geoengineering as a potential "insurance policy" that buys the planet
time, cooling it off a bit while the atmosphere waits for the other mitigation strategies to
catch up. 29 Opponents deride it as too speculative and a distraction from CO 2 emissions
reduction and express concerns that it causes too high a risk for adverse environmental
side effects and unpredictable, unintended consequences. 30 The language of this debate
Jan. 27, 2009, at 146, available at http://www.cell.com/current-biology/abstract/S0960-9822(08)01680-1.
22. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 1(8), May 9, 1982, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107,
165 [hereinafter UNFCCC].

23. Id.
24. Biber, supra note 21, at 1357; Davis, supra note 14, at 920.
25. Glossary of Climate Change Acronyms, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential background/glossary/items/3666.php#C (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
26. Id.;
Glossary,
CARBON
FINANCE,
http://www.carbon-financeonline.com/index.cfin?
section=glossary&letter-C (follow "glossary" hyperlink; then follow "C" hyperlink) (last accessed Oct. 10,
2010).
27. SALLY BENSON ET AL., Underground Geological Storage, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE 195, 197 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2005), available
at http://www.ipec.ch/publications-and-data/publicationsanddata reports.shtml. See also Sleipner Vest,
STATOIL (last updated Sept. 12, 2009, 2:14 PM), http://www.statoil.com/en/TechnologyInnovation/
ProtectingTheEnvironment/CarboncaptureAndStorage/Pages/CarbonDioxidelnjectionSleipnerVest.aspx.
One
method of carbon sequestration involves identifying a spot that produces a lot of CO 2 (like a factory),
redirecting the CO 2 away from the atmosphere, and injecting it deep into the seabed. Research indicates that
CO 2 can remain safely tucked away for 1000 years, though it requires careful maintenance and has many risks
associated with it. BENSON ET AL., supra at 197.
28. Pete Smith et al., Agriculture, in CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 497, 506 (B. Metz et al. eds., 2007)
(explaining three categories for mitigating GHGs in agriculture), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications
anddata/ar4/wg3/en/contents.html. See also Powell, Fertilizing the Ocean, supra note 4. For other examples
of techniques in the second category of geoengineering, see Gert Jan Nabuurs et al., Forestry, in
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 2007 497, 506 (B. Metz et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications-and data/ar4/wg3/en/contents.html; Smith, supra, at 506; Lisa Abend,
Carbon: The Biochar Solution, TIME (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,1864279,00.html.
29. Barrett, supra note 18, at 47. Climate change is considered "abrupt" if it takes place over one to two
decades. Id See also T.M.L. Wigley, A Combined Mitigation/Geoengineering Approach to Climate
Stabilization, 314 Sci. 452, 454 (2006); Mooney, supra note 20; Victor, supra note 18, at 2.
30. See Alan Robock, 20 Reasons Why Geoengineering May Be a Bad Idea, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, May/June 2008, at 17, available at http://www.thebulletin.org/files/064002006 0.pdf. See also
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- with terms like speculative, unpredictable, and potential - points to the overarching
weakness of geoengineering: pervasive uncertainty. 31 Geoengineering remains a "fringe
topic," with very little in the way of scientific literature.32 Some environmental groups
continue to push a ban on all geoengineering engineering projects, while several major
scientific institutions, such as the American Meteorological Society, the American
Geophysical Union, and the U.K. Royal Society, encourage the cautious continuation of
geoengineering research. 33 The knowledge compiled by such research would promote
the establishment of international geoengineering norms resulting in well-informed,
more effective international regulation. 34 Currently, direct international regulation of
geoengineering is in its nascent stage. 35 A lack of specific laws and a "paucity of much
hard legal analysis" make it difficult to answer questions about the legality of
geoengineering.36
B.

Ocean Iron Fertilization

October 2010 saw a major development in international law targeting the
regulation of one potential geoengineering strategy: ocean iron fertilization (OIF). 37
During their October 11-15, 2010, consultative meeting, the Contracting Parties to the
1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter (London Convention) and Contracting Parties to the 1996 Protocol thereto
(London Protocol) agreed on an Assessment Framework for ocean iron fertilization. 38
Debate about the legality and credibility of OIF is gaining steam in the international
arena now more than ever. 39 OIF had been in danger of a flat, global moratorium, despite
the useful insight into marine processes it has provided and its potential as a
geoengineering strategy to fight climate change.40 Through their recent regulations,
however, the London Convention and London Protocol (LC/LP), seem to have saved and

Barrett, supranote 18, at 48-49; Biber, supranote 21, at 1358-59; Davis, supra note 14, at 906; Mooney, supra
note 20; Victor, supra note 18, at 4.
31. Victor, supra note 18, at 4.
32. Id.
33. Lauren Morello & Climatewire, At UN. Convention, Groups Push for Geoengineering Moratorium,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfn?id=at-un-conventiongroups-push.
34. Victor, supranote 18, at 4.
35. Juliet Eilperin, First-Ever Congressional Geoengineering Report Released, POST CARBON,
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 29, 2010, 5:15 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/post-carbon/2010/10/firstever congressional geoen.html.
36. Rex J. Zedalis, Climate Change and the NationalAcademy of Sciences' Idea of Geoengineering: One
American Academic's Perspective on First Considering the Text of Existing InternationalAgreements, EUR.
ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV., at 19 (Feb. 2010). Further discussion of the legality of geoengineering in general is
outside the scope of this paper.
37. Press Briefing, International Maritime Organization, Assessment Framework for Scientific Research
Involving Ocean Fertilization Agreed, (Oct. 20, 2010), available at http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressB
riefings/Pages/Assessment-Framework-for-scientific-research-involving-ocean-fertilization-agreed.aspx
[hereinafter Press Briefing].
38. Id.
39. Aaron Strong et al., Ocean Fertilization- Science, Policy, and Commerce, 22 OCEANOGRAPHY 236
(2009) [hereinafter Strong et al., Science, Policy, and Commerce].
40. Press Release, ETC Group, Global Moratorium on Ocean Fertilization? (May 30, 2008), available at
http://www.etcgroup.org/upload/publication/693/01/etcnrmay30_08oceanfert.pdf.
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legitimized OIF for the purposes of scientific research. 4 1
1.

The Discovery of Ocean Iron Fertilization

While several methods of ocean fertilization exist today, the most common method
disperses iron dust. 42 Research from the Earth's ice ages demonstrated that naturally
occurring iron fertilization might have contributed to a substantial planetary cool down
by drawing sizeable amounts of CO 2 out of the Earth's atmosphere. 43 John Martin, the
biogeochemist credited with the first OIF discoveries and experiments, noticed that when
he sprinkled iron dust in a particular area of the ocean, giant masses of phytoplankton
bloomed as a result. 44 An optimistic new theory bloomed as well: since phytoplankton
naturally absorb atmospheric CO 2 through the process of photosynthesis, scientists
wondered if the calculated use of this method could result in a CO 2 sink and combat
climate change. 45
2.

The Process of Ocean Iron Fertilization

The thirteen OIF experiments that have taken place to date involved a fertilization
process that is long, tedious, and largely dependent on uncontrollable conditions. 4 6 First,
the waters chosen for OIF are essential; researchers continue to study a variety of high
seas locations to determine which waters are most likely to produce successful
phytoplankton blooms.47 Upon arriving at the selected area in the middle of the ocean,
scientists on a research ship release a slurry of iron sulfate, then spend hours diligently
spreading the added substance by "zigzagging" through the slurry to promote
phytoplankton growth.48 Monitoring the bloom's development is extremely difficult
because the iron "rapidly dilutes, sinks, and reacts with seawater, becoming virtually
undetectable after a few days" and tiny zooplankton that eat the blooms before they can
effectively absorb CO 2.4 9 Finally, the fluctuating factors of wind and light affect the
41. Press Briefing, supra note 37.
42. Ken 0. Buesseler et al., Ocean Iron Fertilization-MovingForward in a Sea of Uncertainty, SC., Jan.
11, 2008, at 162, 162, availableat http://academics2.vmi.edu/bio/humstonr/GCC/Buesseler/ 20et%20al%20
2008.pdf. For more information on other methods of ocean fertilization, see International Maritime
Organization, Ocean Fertilization: Exploration of Marine Geo-engineering, submitted by the Chairman of the
Scientific Groups to the Contracting Parties to the London Convention and London Protocol, Sess. 32/5, Oct.
11-15, 2010, IMO Doc. LC 32/4 (July 28, 2010); R.S. Lampitt et al., Ocean Fertilization:A PotentialMeans of
Geoengineering?,366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL Soc'Y A, Aug. 29, 2008, at 3919, available at
http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/366/1882/3919.full.pdf+html.
43. Lampitt et al., supra note 42, at 3927. See also Powell, Fertilizingthe Ocean, supra note 4, at 1; Hugh
Powell,
Lessons from
Nature, Models, and the
Past, OCEANUS
(Jan.
9,
2008),
http://www.whoi.edu/oceanus/viewArticle.do?id=35746&sectionid=1000%20 [hereinafter Powell, Lessons
from Nature].
44. Powell, Fertilizingthe Ocean, supra note 4, at 1.
45. Michelle Alsopp et al., A Scientific Critique of Oceanic Iron Fertilization as a Climate Change
Mitigation Strategy, GREENPEACE RESEARCH LABS. TECHNICAL NOTE 07/2002, Sept. 2007, at 2, available at

http://www.climos.com/imo/Other/Othergreenpeace iron fert critiqSep2007.pdf.
46. Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 563. See also Hugh Powell, Will Ocean Iron Fertilization Work?, 2
OCEANUS (Jan. 7, 2008), http://www.whoi.edu/oceanus/viewArticle.do?id=35609&sectionid=1000 [hereinafter
Powell, Will Ocean Iron FertilizationWork?].
47. Powell, Will Ocean Iron Fertilization Work?, supra note 46, at 2-3.
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id. at 2-3.
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success of the photosynthesis process of the phytoplankton. 50
The ultimate goal of OIF is to store the absorbed CO 2 in either dead phytoplankton
cells or fecal pellets produced by phytoplankton-eating organisms.51 Success then hangs
on whether these storage units actually sink into the ocean depths to stay, sequestered
away for centuries.52 Some OIF proponents argue that even if the CO 2 only sank to midlevel waters to stay for merely a few decades, it would still buy the planet some time
while society continues its efforts to reduce CO 2 emissions. 53 Early predictions about the
effectiveness of OIF raised great hopes of eliminating one to two billion tons of CO 2
from the atmosphere every year. 54 Although research from the thirteen OIF operations
carried out thus far has demonstrated that the OIF process does in fact draw down
atmospheric CO 2, the results have shown fairly modest amounts of CO 2 actually
sequestered.55 Scientists remain undeterred, claiming, "[i]f iron fertilization achieves
only 10 per cent of the one-billion-ton-per-year potential for carbon removal, that
would ... perhaps still [be] a large enough number to be of use in mitigating climate
change."56 Though opponents use these so-called "modest results" to criticize OIF for its
ineffectiveness, perhaps they do so unfairly; the vast majority of OIF experiments
focused not on carbon drawdown, but on the effect of carbon on the oceans or the
process of OIF itself.57
3.

The Ocean Iron Fertilization Debate

One area of debate surrounding OIF as a geoengineering technique to reverse
climate change concerns its potential environmental consequences, reiterating the
recurring geoengineering quandary: are there enough demonstrable benefits to outweigh
the potential for adverse consequences? 58 Besides the potential as a CO 2 sink, OIF may
have other positive side effects, such as restoring fish stocks and phytoplankton levels
that have dwindled due to C0 2-induced ocean acidification. 59 But OIF carries a number
of risks, and even its proponents recognize doubts about its "practicality, efficacy, and
safety." 60 For example, as phytoplankton make up the very foundation of the marine

50. Alsopp et al., supranote 45, at 7.
51. Powell, Fertilizing the Ocean, supranote 4, at 2. See also Powell, Will Ocean Iron Fertilization Work?,
supra note 46, at 4.
52. Powell, Fertilizing the Ocean, supra note 4, at 2.
53. Powell, Will Ocean Iron FertilizationWork?, supra note 46, at 2.
54. Powell, Fertilizing the Ocean, supra note 4, at 1.
55. Id. See also Powell, Will Ocean Iron Fertilization Work?, supra note 46, at 1. The thirteenth OIF
experiment, LOHAFEX, took place in 2009. Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 556-58.
56. Powell, Will Ocean Iron FertilizationWork?, supranote 46, at 4.
57. UNESCO-IOC, Statement by the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (OC), submitted to
the Scientific Groups of the London Convention and London Protocol, Sess. 31/2, May 19-23, 2008, IMO Doc.
LC/SG 31/2/2 (Apr. 4, 2008) [hereinafter IOC Statement]. See also Buesseler et al., supra note 42; Strong et
al., Science, Policy, and Commerce, supra note 39, at 239-42; Black, supra note 8; Peter Liss et al., Ocean
Fertilizationwith Iron: Effects on Climate and Air Quality, 57B TELLUs 269, 270 (2005).
58. See Alsopp et al., supra note 45, at 3-4.
59. Jessica Marshall, Rising Ocean Acidity May Deplete Vital Phytoplankton, DISCOVERY NEWS (Jan. 14,
See also Hugh
2010), http://news.discovery.com/earth/phytoplankton-iron-ocean-acidity.html?print-true.
Powell,
What
Are
the
Possible
Side
Effects?,
OCEANUS
(Jan.
8,
2008),
http://www.whoi.eduloceanus/viewArticle.do?id=35668 [hereinafter Powell, Side Effects].
60. Powell, Fertilizing the Ocean, supra note 4, at 2.
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food chain, any alteration to their levels could result in far-reaching damages. 6 1 The OIF
process may also produce greenhouse gases far worse than CO 2, which would outweigh
any CO 2 abatement.62 Some early research shows that OIF may increase the risk of
ocean acidification.63 The artificial stimulation of phytoplankton growth could deplete
nutrients from adjacent areas of the ocean. 64 OIF may also contribute to the formation of
a kind of algae that is toxic to certain marine mammals.65 Finally, the increased amounts
of phytoplankton absorbing sunlight might lead to higher surface water temperature,
which would both increase global warming and diminish OIF experiments'
effectiveness. 66 The projects performed to date have been small-scale scientific researchfocused projects that have not produced these largely speculative effects, which pose a
67
greater potential threat in the context of projects on a larger scale.
The debate concerning the legality of OIF parallels the debate over environmental
consequences; the legal issues grow more problematic in the context of large-scale,
commercial, geoengineering-focused OIF projects.68 The primary avenue for potential
OIF commercialization involves employing it as a geoengineering technique and
69
engaging in carbon trading based on the amount of CO 2 drawn down by the process.
For OIF to generate enough CO 2 drawdown to make it a viable option on the carbon
trading market, projects would have to take place on a vastly larger scale than the
research projects heretofore executed. 70 "No scientific basis for issuing such carbon
credits" exists, as scientists have yet to develop a reliable method of monitoring the
amount of carbon sequestered by OIF. 7 1 Nevertheless, companies touting the tremendous
potential of OIF as a possible carbon trading enterprise are in full swing.72 If OIF were
to gain undeserved credibility as a lucrative geoengineering operation, these OIF carbon
trading companies may jump at the opportunity by launching large-scale OIF projects in
exchange for the purchase of carbon credits from customers.7 3 Whether or not such
commercial efforts would enjoy success remains to be seen, but no international law to
date has directly barred this kind of commercial OIF. 74

61. Alsopp et al., supra note 45, at 3.
62. Id.
63. See Long Cao & Ken Calderia, Can Ocean Iron Fertilization Mitigate Ocean Acidification, CLIMATIC
CHANGE, Jan. 20, 2010, availableat http://www.stanford.edu/-longcao/Cao&Caldeira(2010).pdf.
64. Powell, Fertilizingthe Ocean, supranote 4, at 2.
65. Alsopp, supra note 45, at 3.
66. Powell, Side Effects, supranote 59, at 2.
67. Id. at 3.
68. Alsopp et al., supra note 45, at 4. See also Hugh Powell, Dumping Iron and Trading Carbon: Profits,
Pollution, and Politics All Will Play Roles in Ocean Iron Fertilization, OCEANUS (Jan. 10, 2008),
http://www.whoi.eduloceanus/viewArticle.do?id=35826 [hereinafter Powell, Trading Carbon].
69. Strong et al., Science, Policy,and Commerce, supra note 39, at 245-46.
70. Alsopp et al., supra note 45, at 2. See also Strong et al., Science, Policy, and Commerce, supra note 39,
at 245-46.
71. Buesseler et al., supra note 42. See also Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 571.
72. See CLIMOs, http://www.climos.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2010); The Technology, OCEAN
NOURISHMENT CORP., http://www.oceannourishment.com/technology.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2010); Other
Applications, C02, ATMOCEAN INC., http://atmocean.com/OceanCO2_Sequestration.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2010).
73. Strong et al., Science, Policy,and Commerce, supra note 39, at 248-49.
74. Id. at 250.
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The Argument for OIF Research

Some activists and commentators argue that OIF's inadequate results and potential
risks may not justify investment into continued research, and that resources should be
redirected toward the continued development of other climate change mitigation
strategies. 75 As it stands now, OIF is nowhere near ready for use as a geoengineering
tool to combat global climate change.76 On the other hand, the chief scientists from the
LOHAFEX experiment support cautious research of OIF, suggesting "larger and longer
experiments to test both the geoengineering potential of OIF and the potential for
unintended negative side effects." 7 7
The majority of the literature analyzing OIF, however, settles on the middle
ground, and advocates laying aside projects aimed solely at determining OIF's
geoengineering potential in favor of projects directed at building scientific knowledge
about marine processes.78 Small-scale, scientific research projects have gained the most
favor, while large-scale projects remain suspect. 79 The Convention on Biological
Diversity stated the need for legitimate scientific research into the actual outcomes and
effectiveness of OIF. A consultative group from the UN's International Oceanic
Commission affirmed OIF research as a tool for studying the ocean, stating that
researchers could safely carry out carefully designed research projects.81
There is a growing consensus that, because OIF has shown moderate success,
legitimate scientific research subject to an international legal framework is a reasonable
approach to future OIF experiments.82 This sliding scale of views on scientific research
of OIF, and the middle road struck by many commentators, foreshadowed recent
advances in international regulation of OIF. 83 These advances are developing out of a
"hodge-podge, patchwork of inexact international rules" into an ever more precise,
streamlined set of regulations targeted directly at OIF. 84

75. See Jennie Dean, Iron Fertilization:A Scientific Review with InternationalPolicy Recommendations,
32-SPG ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 321, 339; Alsopp et al., supra note 45, at 8; Powell, Fertilizing the
Ocean, supra note 4, at 4.
76. Strong et al., Science, Policy, and Commerce, supra note 39, at 256.
77. Id. at 246.
78. Aaron Strong et al., Ocean Fertilization:Time to Move On, NATURE, Sept. 17, 2009, at 347.
79. Id. at 348.
80. SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS OF THE
IMPACTS OF OCEAN FERTILIZATION ON MARINE BIODIVERSITY 5 (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological
Diversity, CBD Technical Series No. 45 2009) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS].

81. IOC Statement, supra note 57.
82. Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 571. See also Buesseler et al., supra note 42; Dean, supra note 75, at
339; Strong et al., Science, Policy, and Commerce, supra note 39, at 258; Margaret Leinen et al., Why Ocean
Iron Fertilization?, CLIMOS (Mar. 12, 2009), at 20, http://www.climos.com/pubs/2009/Climos-WhyOIF2009-03-12.pdf.
83. See IMO Res. LC-LP.2 (2010) on the Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involving Ocean
Fertilization, adopted Oct. 14, 2010 (advance copy on file with author) [hereinafter LC-LP.2]; IMO Annex 6
Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involving Ocean Fertilization, adopted Oct. 14, 2010 (advance
copy on file with author) [hereinafter Assessment Framework].
84. Zedalis, supranote 36, at 32.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OCEAN IRON FERTILIZATION

A. InternationalLegal Instruments That Speak Indirectly to Ocean Iron Fertilization
Events surrounding the most recent OIF expedition, LOHAFEX, produced a study
of the ineffectiveness of international regulation of OIF. 85 The twelve small-scale OIF
research expeditions prior to LOHAFEX were not subject to any specific laws in any
country and took place without any kind of permit.86 LOHAFEX provided the first
exception.8 7 LOHAFEX scientists submitted a proposal for their experiment to the
German government, vaguely stating that their project complied with international law,
citing the Convention on Biological Diversity's Decision IX/16 statement about ocean
fertilization as the authority for granting approval. The German Research Ministry
subsequently issued a permit for the research. 89 However, amid substantial protest from
environmental groups, the German Environment Ministry persuaded the German
Research Ministry to revoke permission.90 The LOHAFEX vessel waited several days
between its point of departure and its destination before the German Research Ministry
reinstated its permit, stating that it was "convinced there [were] no scientific or legal
objections" to the project.91 After reviewing the same set of facts, the two German
ministries took polar opposite views about the experiment's legality. 92
The legal confusion surrounding LOHAFEX brought attention to the insufficiency
of existing international law, and the necessity of establishing a coherent international
framework to regulate OIF. 93 The necessity became urgent in light of private companies
gearing up to launch OIF projects with decidedly commercial motives. 94 One such
company, Climos, is preparing to carry out several "OIF demonstration experiments" to
explore the appropriateness of using OIF as a climate mitigation strategy. 95 Climos
expresses its willingness to apply for permit under the London Convention and London
Protocol, while in the next breath casting doubt about the applicability of the London
Convention and London Protocol to OIF, noting a loophole through which they could
perhaps escape any direct legal obligation.96 This kind of existing legal ambiguity
technically means that there is nothing to bar commercial OIF expeditions from moving

85. Abate & Greenlee, supranote 7, at 585-87.
86. Strong et al., Science, Policy, and Commerce, supra note 39, at 250.
87. Bhattacharya, supra note 10.
88. CBD Decision IX/16, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/16, 7 (Oct. 9, 2008) [hereinafter CBD
Decision I16]; Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 586.
89. CBD Decision IX/16, supra note 88, at 7; Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 557-58.
90. Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 557-58; Black, supra note 8.
91. Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 557-58.
92. Id.
93. Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 588.
94. Id.; David Freestone & Rosemary Rayfuse, Ocean Iron Fertilization and InternationalLaw, 364
MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 227, 227 (2008).

95. Frequently Asked Questions About Ocean Fertilization, CLIMOS, http://www.climos.com/faq.php#16
[hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions] (last visited Oct. 18, 2010). Australia-based Ocean Nourishment
Corporation is another example, though its techniques for fertilization are different. See OCEAN NOURISHMENT
CORP., http://www.oceannourishment.com/default.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).
96. Frequently Asked Questions,supra note 95.
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forward, permit or not.9 7
Governance of OIF on the international level is ideal as experiments take place on
the high seas, beyond any country's exclusive economic zone, and thus outside any
particular country's jurisdiction.98 However, developing an international regulatory
scheme can be difficult given the broad spectrum of opinions about the best way to
regulate OIF, ranging from an outright ban to allowing research connected to financial
gain.99 Studies of international law concerning OIF reveal a handful of treaty provisions
that indirectly apply to OIF, and a conspicuous absence of laws that directly apply to
it. 0 0 For the purposes of this paper, a brief synopsis of these provisions suffices to
illustrate the need for more coherent international OIF regulation.
1.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto
Protocol

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) does
not contain any provisions directly related to OIF. 101 However, one can construe certain
provisions as indirectly reaching it.10 2 A primary principle of the UNFCCC is that
Parties must consider the interests of those other than themselves when it comes to
preserving the environment, including the interests of other states and "future
generations.,,1o3 Article 3(3) requires Parties to "take precautionary measures" to combat
climate change, encouraging them to consider the viability of carbon sinks and reservoirs
in order to do so. 104 When "irreversible damage" to the environment looms, a "lack of
full scientific certainty" about remedial measures is no excuse to delay using them under
the UNFCCC. 10 5 Article 4(l)(b) and (d) require Parties to address carbon emissions by
using carbon sinks when appropriate, while 4(1)(f) keeps them on the hook for assessing
the potential adverse effects stemming from the methods they use.106 Taken together,
Parties could interpret these provisions to reflect no prohibition of OIF due to limited
scientific knowledge about the process and its effects, but rather supporting the use of
OIF as a carbon sink as long as Parties can adequately assess its safety.107 Of course,
should OIF prove to have harmful effects, using it as a climate mitigation technique
would contravene the principles of the UNFCCC. 0 8 However, if OIF does one day
prove useful in the fight against climate change, pursuant to the UNFCCC, Parties could
employ it as a means to preserve the environment. In any case, any implied blessing

97. Strong et al., Science, Policy, and Commerce, supra note 39, at 250.
98. Id.; Powell, Trading Carbon,supra note 68.
99. See Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 593. See also Dean, supra note 75, at 333.
100. See infra notes 97-140.
101. Zedalis, supra note 36, at 30.
102. Id.; Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94, at 230; Zedalis, supra note 36, at 30.
103. UNFCCC, supra note 22, pmbl., art. 3(1); Zedalis, supranote 36, at 30.
104. UNFCCC, supra note 22, art. 3(3); Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94, at 231; Zedalis, supra note 36,
at 31.
105. UNFCCC, supra note 22, art. 3(3); Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94, at 232.
106. UNFCCC, supra note 22, art. 4(1)(b), (d), (f); Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94, at 231; Zedalis,
supra note 36, at 31.
107. See Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94, at 231.
108. Zedalis, supranote 36, at 31.
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upon OIF under the UNFCCC is constructive; the treaty does not supply any direct
regulation of OIF. 10 9
The Kyoto Protocol (KP), designed to give further clarity to the UNFCCC, limits
one capacity in which Parties could use OIF as a climate change mitigation strategy. 110
The KP's main purpose is to give countries practical tools, such as carbon trading, to
reduce carbon emissions.111 While the KP mentions carbon sinks as a means for
producing carbon credits, Article 3(3) currently limits sinks to afforestation,
reforestation, and deforestation. 112 According to Article 12, for any new type of carbon
sink projects to gain credibility under the KP, their method for calculating emissions
reduction must satisfy an executive board. 113 Given the skepticism about the
effectiveness of OIF in drawing down carbon, it is unlikely to see admittance as a viable
sink under the KP any time soon. 1 14 The KP thus indirectly ousts OIF from major carbon
trading schemes. 1 15 Those who hope to derive financial benefits from carbon trading
with OIF must seek acceptance on the voluntary carbon trading market. 116
2.

Convention on Biological Diversity

While the text of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) does not directly
address OIF, one can interpret select provisions as reaching the activity. 117 Articles 7
and 14 require CBD Parties to "identify processes and categories of activities which ...
are likely to have significant adverse impacts on the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity, and monitor their effects."
Once Parties have identified said
processes or activities, Article 8 requires them to "regulate and manage" them. 119
The CBD seems to have identified large-scale OIF as an activity likely to have
adverse effects on biological diversity, and, as such, have taken steps to regulate it.120 In
May 2008, the CBD issued Decision IX/16, urging States to "use the utmost caution
when considering . . . large-scale" OIF proposals and stated that limited scientific

knowledge about OIF did not justify such projects. 12 1 The CBD added an exception
allowing scientific research of OIF within "coastal waters," though the exception was
essentially useless, as effective OIF experiments take place on the high seas.122 In 2009,
109. See id.
110. See Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94, at 231.
111. Id. A full discussion of the carbon trading system is outside the scope of this paper. For more
information, see id.
112. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3(3), Dec. 10,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
113. Id. at art. 12; Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94, at 231; Dean,supra note 75, at 338.
114. See Abate & Greenlee, supranote 7, at 593; Dean, supra note 75, at 338.
115. See Dean,supra note 75, at 338.
116. See id.
117. See Zedalis, supra note 36, at 29.
118. Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 7(c), art. 14, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter
CBD].
119. Id. art. 8; Zedalis, supra note 36, at 29.
120. CBD, supranote 118, art. 7-8.
121. CBD Decision IX/16, supra note 88, at 7; Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 576; Zedalis, supra note
36, at 30.
122. See CBD Decision DIX16, supra note 88, at 7; Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 577; Strong et al.,
Science, Policy, and Commerce, supranote 39, at 255; Zedalis, supranote 36, at 30.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol46/iss2/6

12

Eick: A Navigational System for uncharted Waters: The London Convention
A NAVIGATIONAL SYSTEM FOR UNCHARTED WATERS

2010

363

the CBD expressed a more moderate stance in its Scientific Synthesis about OIF,
acknowledging the validity of "legitimate scientific research," and expressing the need
for an international assessment framework regulating OIF.123 Finally, at their most
recent meeting, the CBD stated explicit disapproval of geoengineering in general by
placing a ban on all such projects until "there is an adequate scientific basis on which to
justify such activities." 124 In that same meeting, however, the CBD also acknowledged
the LC/LP's contribution to "global, transparent and effective control" of OIF, perhaps
implying acquiescence to letting the LC/LP take the lead in this specific area of
geoengineering.125
3.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Known as the "Constitution for the ocean," many consider the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the codification of customary
international law governing most all activities that take place in the ocean.126 In general,
Article 192 requires all States to "protect and preserve the marine environment."I27 In
particular, Article 194 requires them to "prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment from any source."l28 Article I defines pollution, not according to its
substance, but as whether it is likely to cause "deleterious effects," such as harming
marine or human life. 129 Some see OIF as a potential means for satisfying these aims of
UNCLOS by preserving the global environment and reducing atmospheric C0 2; others
see it as outright pollution because of its potential to harm marine life, with possible
adverse consequences on humans as well. 130
UNCLOS dumping provisions are particularly relevant to OIF.131 Article 1(5), in
relevant part, defines dumping as any "deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from
vessels . . . at sea."l32 The provision also contains an exception to the dumping rule for

matter placed in the ocean "for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, provided

123. SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS, supra note 80, at 9; Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 584.
124. Eilperin, supranote 35.
125. Convention on Biological Diversity, COP 10 draft Decision 10.L36, § 8(w), Sess. 10, Oct. 18-29, 2010,
U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/L.36 (Oct. 29, 2010); Convention on Biological Diversity, COP 10 Draft
Decision 10.L42, §§ 59, 60, Sess. 10, Oct. 18-29, 2010, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/L.42 (Oct. 29, 2010);
Eilperin, supra note 35.
126. Philomene Verlaan, Geo-engineering, the Law of the Sea, and Climate Change, 4 CARBON & CLIMATE
L. REv. 446, 448 (2009) (reprinted in Ocean Fertilization, Geo-engineering, the Law of the Sea and Climate
Change, submitted by Int'l Union for the Conservation of Nature to the Contracting Parties of the London
Convention and London Protocol, IMO Doc. LC 32/INF.2 (May 26, 2010)); Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note
94, at 228.
127. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 192, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
UNCLOS]; Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 573; Dean, supra note 75, at 334; Verlaan, supra note 126, at
449-50; Zedalis, supra note 36, at 28.
128. UNCLOS, supra note 127, art. 194; Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 575; Dean, supra note 75, at
334; Verlaan, supranote 126, at 449-50; Zedalis, supra note 36, at 28.
129. UNCLOS, supra note 127, art. 1(4); Dean, supranote 75, at 335; Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94,
at 229; Verlaan, supranote 126, at 449; Zedalis, supra note 36, at 28.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 54-70.
131. See infra text accompanying notes 129-35.
132. UNCLOS, supra note 127, art. 1(5); Dean, supra note 75, at 335; Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94,
at 229.
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that such placement is not contrary to the aims of this Convention." 1 33 Article 210
requires States to prevent and manage marine pollution by establishing a process for
issuing national dumping permits and to develop international dumping standards under
the auspices of an international body (hence the formation of the LC/LP).1 34 A
substantial part of the OIF debate has centered on whether OIF experiments
impermissibly "dump" iron into the sea or satisfy the dumping exemption by merely
"placing" the iron there. 135 Later sections focusing on the LC/LP will explore this debate
further. 136
Finally, and especially relevant in light of recent OIF regulations, Article 240 sets
out the principles for "marine scientific research." 1 3 7 While providing no clear definition
of what constitutes such acceptable research, this provision does mandate that all
research "be conducted in compliance with all relevant regulations adopted in
conformity" with UNCLOS.1 3 8 The design and content of the LC/LP complies with
UNCLOS and gives effect to its dumping provisions.139 It is reasonable to determine
that LC/LP regulations for the proper execution of legitimate scientific research of OIF,
which specifically require consideration of UNCLOS principles, would likewise
comply.1 40
B. The London Convention andLondon Protocol'sDirect Regulation of OIF
The LC/LP work concurrently toward the prevention and, ultimately, the
elimination of marine pollution caused by dumping.14 1 The 1975 London Convention
was one of the first treaties to give effect to practical protections of the oceans.142 Its
successor, the 1996 London Protocol, was developed to replace the London Convention,
but has only been in force for four years and has fewer than half the number of
contracting parties as the London Convention. 14 3 Despite a few differences, the LC/LP
work together - "two instruments - one family," as Chairman Victor Escobar Paredes
paternally proclaimed at their first joint meeting.144 To date, the LC/LP have performed
some of the most extensive work toward regulating OIF.145

133. UNCLOS, supra note 127, art. 1(5); Dean, supra note 75, at 335; Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94,
at 229.
134. UNCLOS, supra note 127, art. 210; Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 575-76; Dean, supra note 75, at
335; Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94, at 229. See also UNCLOS, supranote 127, art. 194(3)(a).
135. Dean, supra note 75, at 335-36.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 149-57.
137. UNCLOS, supra note 127, art. 240.
138. UNCLOS, supra note 127, art. 240(d); Zedalis, supra note 36, at 29.
139. Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94, at 229-30.
140. See Assessment Framework, supranote 83; Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94, at 229.
141. IMO BROCHURE, THE LONDON CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL: THEIR ROLE AND CONTRIBUTION TO
PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT, http://www5.imo.org/SharePoint/blastDataHelper.asp/data

id%3D21278/LC-LPbrochure.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) [hereinafter IMO BROCHURE].
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Alan B. Sielen, The New InternationalRules on Ocean Dumping: Promise and Performance, 21 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 495, 525 (2009) (noting differences between the London Convention and the London
Protocol); Verlaan, supra note 126, at 453.
145. Sielen, supra note 144, at 525.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol46/iss2/6

14

Eick: A Navigational System for uncharted Waters: The London Convention
2010

A NAVIGATIONAL SYSTEM FOR UNCHARTED WATERS
1.

365

Provisions Relevant to OIF

The LC/LP share closely related objectives, though they differ slightly. The
London Convention requires Contracting Parties (CP) "control" and "prevent the
pollution of the sea by the dumping of waste," while the London Protocol employs
stronger language, requiring CPs to "prevent, reduce and where practicable eliminate
pollution caused by dumping."l 46 The LC/LP contain the exact same dumping and
exemption provisions as UNCLOS, but with the added proviso that any exemption must
not be "contrary to the aims of' the LC/LP.1 4 7 For OIF proposals to gain LC/LP
approval, they must comply with these objectives.148
Whether the LC/LP can even apply to OIF depends largely on the definition of
dumping.1 49 Researchers do not place iron in the oceans merely for disposal, so OIF
seems to fall within the exemption. 150 If such a determination wholly exempted OIF
from dumping regulation, then there is doubt as to whether the LC/LP could even govern
such activities.151 However, should OIF prove to have deleterious effects on human or
marine health, then it would contravene the LC/LP's objectives and CPs would have to
take steps to prevent or eliminate it.152 Lists of the permitted and prohibited substances
for dumping, as laid out in the LC/LP annexes, shed no light on the question of OIF.1 53
The London Convention first lists substances categorically prohibited from dumping, and
then lists substances requiring a special permit from the CP, who has jurisdiction over
the dumping project. 154 The London Protocol uses a "reverse list," prohibiting CPs from
dumping any substances except for the few items found in its Annex 1.155 The iron
compound used in OIF is nowhere to be found on these lists, nor have experts
persuasively analogized to any listed substance. 156
Unlike the London Convention, the London Protocol incorporates the
precautionary principle which requires CPs to exercise great caution should they believe
that a substance put in the ocean is "likely to cause harm even when there is no
conclusive evidence to prove a causal relation" between the substance and subsequent
effects. 157 Some see the addition of this principle to the London Protocol as substantially
raising the bar that OIF proponents must meet in establishing the safety of their
146. 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter (London Protocol), preamble, Nov. 7, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1 (1997) [hereinafter London Protocol];
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London
Convention), art. 1, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403 [hereinafter London Convention].
147. London Protocol, supra note 146, art. 4.2(2); London Convention, supra note 146, art. Ill; Dean, supra
note 75, at 335-36; Zedalis, supra note 36, at 26.
148. See IMO, Annex 6, Res. LC-LP.1 (2008) On the Regulation of Ocean Fertilization, IMO Doc. LC 30/16
(Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter LC-LP.1].
149. Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94, at 229-30.
150. Zedalis, supranote 36, at 26.
151. Dean, supra note 75, at 335-36. See Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94, at 229.
152. Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94, at 229.
153. London Protocol, supra note 146, Annex 1; London Convention, supra note 146, Annex 1, II.
154. London Convention, supra note 146, Annex 1,Annex II.
155. London Protocol, supra note 146, Annex 1; Sielen, supra note 144, at 531.
156. London Protocol, supra note 146, Annex 1; London Convention, supra note 146, Annex 1, 11;See Dean,
supra note 75, at 336.
157. London Protocol, supra note 146, art. 3(1); Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 578; Verlaan, supra note
126, at 453.
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experiments.158 Notably, however, the most well-known articulation of the
precautionary principle for environmental protection states that "lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing . . . measures to prevent
environmental degradations."l 59 Proponents of OIF could invoke the precautionary
principle to argue in favor of continued research despite the scientific uncertainty
involved, given its unknown potential to prevent environmental degradation.1 60
Finally, the LC/LP's reach is limited to the States who are its Contracting
Parties.161 Even if OIF regulation does fall within the jurisdiction of the LC/LP, only
those who are party to the treaties would have an obligation to abide by it.162 It may be
possible for OIF researchers to evade regulation by simply approaching a nonContracting Party from which to launch its operation.163 For the LC/LP to have
loophole-free, global regulation of OIF, its hopes lie in the strength of its regulations to
eventually establish international OIF norms by which all nations will abide.164
2.

Ownership of OIF

Despite the debate once kicked around regarding the LC/LP's applicability to OIF,
most consider the LC/LP the primary "international legal framework" regulating OIF
today.165 The first step that the LC/LP took toward claiming ownership of OIF began
with the "Statement of Concern" on large-scale ocean fertilization issued by the
Scientific Groups to the LC/LP in 2007.166 After the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change found OIF to be a potential, albeit speculative and potentially risky,
means to sink CO 2 and fight climate change, the Scientific Groups' "Statement of
Concern" encouraged the CPs to consider regulations aimed at reining in large-scale
OIF.16 7
About one year later, the CPs adopted a resolution agreeing amongst themselves
that OIF activities fell within the purview of the LC/LP.1 6 8 On one hand, the resolution
declared that OIF, for the purposes of large-scale commercial use, was unjustified and
"contrary to the aims" of the LC/LP.1 69 On the other hand, the resolution brought OIF

158. See Kerstin Gissow et al., Ocean Iron Fertilization. Why FurtherResearch Is Needed 16 (Kiel Inst. for
the World Econ., Working Paper No. 1574, 2009), available at http://www.ifw-members.ifwkiel.de/publications/ocean-iron-fertilization-why-further-research-is-needed/kwpl574. See also Sielen, supra
note 144, at 525.
159. GUssow et al., supra note 158, at 15. This articulation of the precautionary principle for environmental
protection originates in the Rio Declaration. Id.
160. See Gtissow et al., supra note 158, at 15-16.
161. Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94, at 230.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Victor, supra note 18, at 3.
165. Strong et al., Science, Policy, and Commerce, supranote 39, at 256.
166. IMO, Statement of Concern Regarding Iron Fertilization of the Oceans to Sequester CO2, IMO Doc.
LC-LP. 1/Circ. 14 (July 13, 2007) [hereinafter Statement of Concern]; Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 579;
Sielen, supra note 144, at 521.
167. Statement of Concern, supranote 166; Sielen, supra note 144, at 521; Verlaan, supra note 127, at 456.
168. LC-LP.1, supra note 148 at 1; Verlaan, supranote 126, at 456.
169. IMO, Rep. of the 31st Meeting of the Scientific Group of the London Convention and the 2d Meeting of
the Scientific Group of the London Protocol, May 19-23, 2008, Annex 2 - Outcome of the Working Group on
Ocean Fertilization, 1-2, IMO Doc. LC/SG 31/16 (July 7, 2008) [hereinafter LC/SG 31/16]; LC-LP.1, supra
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within the shelter of the dumping exemption for the purposes of legitimate scientific
research. 170 In order to determine the status of OIF proposals as legitimate scientific
research, the resolution called for the development of an assessment framework for CPs
to use in evaluating OIF proposals on a case-by-case basis. 171 in the absence of and until
the development of the requested assessment framework, the resolution provided a list of
the "best available guidance" for CPs to use for O1F proposals. 172 The list included a
jumble of sources, including any "previous agreements" made by the CPs and a few
waste assessment guidelines written for the evaluation of other types of dumping
17 3
projects; however, none of these evaluations transferred smoothly to OIF evaluation.
The waste assessment guides contained provisions that stood in direct opposition to
permitting OIF projects at all. 174 One example of such a provision states, "If a waste is
so poorly characterized that proper assessment cannot be made of its potential impacts on
human health and the environment, that waste shall not be dumped." 1 75 CPs could have
easily construed this language as automatically invalidating any OIF proposal, as lack of
scientific knowledge is pervasive in the field of OIF research.176 The urgent need for an
assessment framework tailored specifically for OIF manifested itself early on.177
Through a variety of working groups, the CPs delved into the study of their newly
acquired field of regulation and attempted to understand the science of OIF. They sought
input from scientists who had researched OIF and other marine processes.178 They called
upon international organizations with expertise in marine and environmental studies to
submit their recommendations on OIF issues. 179 An ad hoc committee of OIF experts
from the International Oceanographic Commission (IOC) supplied an important report in
2008 about "large-scale" OIF.180 The report encouraged the CPs to consider a broader
array of factors for evaluating OIF proposals for legitimate scientific research, rather
than ban projects based solely on scale. 18 1 During 2009-2010, the CPs received a
plethora of scientific reports on OIF, including the CBD's "Scientific Synthesis on the
Impacts of Ocean Fertilization" on Marine Biodiversity and a draft of UNESCO -IOC's
note 148, at 2; Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 579; Verlaan, supra note 126, at 456. The Working Group
on Ocean Fertilization later clarified "contrary to the aims" of the LC/LP as any activity that is "likely to result
in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine ecosystems, hazards to human health, and
harm to other legitimate uses of the ocean." LC/SG 31/16, supra note 169.
170. LC-LP.1, supra note 148, at 1-2.
171. Id. at 2.
172. Id. at 2 n.4; Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 580.
173. LC-LP.1, supra note 148, at 2 n.4. CPs were to consult "previous agreements of the Consultative
Meetings/Meetings of Contracting Parties." Id. This guidance was vague compared to other, specifically listed
documents. Id.
174. See Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 579, nn.145-49.
175. IMO, Annex 3 - Revised Guidelines for the Assessment of Wastes or Other Matter That May Be
Considered for Dumping, 14.1, IMO Doc. 30/16 (Dec. 19, 2008).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 54-63.
177. See LC-LP.1, supra note 148.
178. See generally IMO, Ocean Fertilization: Sources of Information on Ocean Fertilization and Related
Matters, Submitted by the U.K. to the Scientific Groups of the London Convention and London Protocol, Sess.
31/2, May 19-23, 2008, IMO Doc. LC/SG 31/INF.15 (Apr. 1, 2008).
179. IMO, Rep. of the 30th Consultative Meeting and the 3d Meeting of Contracting Parties, Oct. 27-31,
2008, 4.5, IMO Doc. LC 30/16 (Dec. 9, 2008).
180. See generally IOC Statement, supranote 57, Annex.
181. LC/SG 31/16, supra note 169, 2.28.2.
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"Summary for Policymakers on Ocean Fertilization." 182 The LC/LP legal
correspondence group has not yet agreed on the degree to which they will use these last
two reports, although the new Assessment Framework reflects scientific information and
concerns presented therein. 183
3.

Options for Making OIF Regulation Legally Binding

The CPs also commissioned several legal working groups to study the legal
correlation between provisions of the London Convention/London Protocol and OIF. The
first legal working group stated in April 2008 that, although the LC/LP are "the most
appropriate legal instruments to regulate [OIF]," the treaties would need textual
amendments to bring OIF officially within their regulatory scope.184 Drafts of the legally
binding options and a new assessment framework began to materialize, leading the CPs
to state that they were "on the right track" in satisfying the goals laid out in resolution
LC-LP. 1185
A full discussion of the legally binding options is outside the scope of this paper; a
brief examination will suffice. 186 The legal working groups reminded the CPs that they
must consider every legally binding option in light of several "'overarching' issues." 1 87
Most significantly, first, the CPs must remember that any placement of materials and any
marine scientific research contrary to the aims of the LC/LP fall within the definition
Second, any changes that the CPs make to the LC/LP should interpret the
"dumping."
language of the treaties as it currently stand, rather than place new requirements on CPs
or expand the instruments' scopes.189 In March 2010, the CPs considered eight legally
binding options to bring OIF officially within the purview of the LC/LP.19 0 As of August
2010, the CPs were still considering Options 4-8.191 These options include an

182. SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS, supra note 80; IMO, Ocean Fertilization: Development of Science Overviews
on Ocean Fertilization, Rep. of the Ocean Fertilization Correspondence Group to the Scientific Group of the
London Convention and London Protocol, Extraordinary Sess., 4, Oct. 7-8, 2010, 1, IMO Doc. LC/SG/ES.2/1
9, 10, Annex 2, Annex 3; IMO, Ocean
(July 30, 2010) [hereinafter Development of Science]. See also id.
Fertilization:Exploration of Marine Geo-engineering,submitted by the Chairman of the Scientific Groups to
the 32d Sess. of the Contracting Parties of the London Convention & 5th Sess. of the Contracting Parties to the
London Protocol, Oct. 11-15, 2010, Annex, 1, IMO Doc. LC 32/4 (July 28, 2010).
183. Development of Science, supra note 182, 2.
184. IMO, Ocean Fertilization: Interim Report of the Legal and Intersessional Correspondence Group on
Ocean Fertilization to the Scientific Groups, submitted by the U.K. to the Scientific Groups of the London
Convention and London Protocol, Sess. 31/2, May 19-23, 2008, IMO Doc. LC/SG 31/2/1 (Apr. 1,2008).
185. Ocean Fertilization: Draft Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involving Ocean
Fertilization, in note by the Secretariat to the Scientific Groups of the London Convention and London
Protocol, 7, IMO Doc. LC/SG 33/2 (Feb. 23, 2010); IMO, Rep. of the 32d Meeting of the Scientific Group of
the London Convention and the 3d Meeting of the Scientific Group of the London Protocol, May 25-29, T 2.6,
2.21, 2.24, 2.28, 2009, IMO Doc. LC/SG 32/15 (June 29,2009) [hereinafter LC/SG 32/15].
186. For further information on the development of the legally binding options, see Rep. of the Ist Meeting
of the LP Intersessional Legal and Related Issues Working Group on Ocean Fertilization, Feb. 11-13, 2009,
IMO Doc. LP/COP 2/5 (Feb. 20, 2009).
187. IMO, Rep. of the 2d Meeting of the LP Intersessional Working Group on Ocean Fertilization, Mar. 1-5,
2010, T 4.1, IMO Doc. LP C02 3/7 (Mar. 19, 2010) [hereinafter 2d Meeting of the LP Intersessional Working
Group].
188. Id. T 4.1.1,4.1.2,4.1.3.
189. Id.
190. 2d Meeting of the LP Intersessional Working Group, supra note 187.
191. IMO, Ocean Fertilization: Development of Regulation on Ocean Fertilization, submitted by Canada to
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interpretive resolution about OIF, various suggested amendments to Annex 1 of the LP,
changes to the definitions of dumping and placement, and the addition of an article to the
LP that specifically addresses OIF.192
Once the CPs adopt one of these options to legally bind regulation of OIF under
the LC/LP, the Assessment Framework on OIF will have legal effect on the CPs for
evaluating future assessment of OIF proposals. Given the CPs momentum in working
through the legally binding options before them, this paper will treat the Assessment
Framework as though it will soon no longer be an optional tool, but a required method
for assessing all OIF proposals brought before CPs.
IV.

A.

THE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INVOLVING OCEAN
FERTILIZATION

Development ofan Assessment Framework

In February 2009, the Intersessional Technical Working Group on Ocean
Fertilization, as well as Greenpeace and other NGOs, gathered for their first meeting on
development of an assessment framework on OIF and to begin sorting out the issues
related to it. 19 3 Significantly, the Working Group first resolved that all OIF projects that
failed to qualify as legitimate scientific research automatically violated LC/LP dumping
regulations.194 Disagreement ensued about how strictly they should define "legitimate
scientific research" and how to define the "competent body" that would eventually
administer assessment framework evaluations, but they reached no conclusions on the
matter. 195 The Working Group also had to decide on, among a host of other things, a
glossary, a means for communicating the results of risk analyses, and the extent to which
the governing bodies established by the CPs had to consult with countries that OlF
experiments might affect the most. 196
Additionally, according to resolution LC-LP.1, the assessment framework also had
to provide tools for CPs to examine OIF proposals on a case-by-case basis, each on its
independent merits. 197 The attributes of individual OIF proposals could differ widely,
thus each one carries its own set of potential risks. 198 The Working Group faced the
difficulty of drafting practicable evaluation tests, all while balancing the need to make
provisions broad enough for CPs to recognize all potential risks with the need to tailor
their assessment to each individual proposal.199

the Contracting Parties of the London Convention and London Protocol, 1 9, IMO Doc. LC 32/4/1 (Aug. 3,
2010). Canada proposed an additional option in August 2010 which would involve the creation of a "permitting
authority for a limited category of placement" which would "expand the scope of the Protocol" to take into
account resolution LC-LP. I and avoid the need to change the longstanding dumping definition. Id. 12.
192. 2d Meeting of the LP Intersessional Working Group, supra note 189, 15.1
193. LC/SG 32/15, supranote 187, $ 2.28; Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 580-81.
194. Strong et al., Science, Policy, and Commerce, supra note 39, at 255.
195. LC/SG 32/15, supranote 187, 2.21-2.22.
196. Id. T 2.24.
197. Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 581.
198. Id.

199. Id.
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The Working Group eventually managed to reach a consensus on these issues. 200
In October 2010, the London Convention and London Protocol issued resolution LCLP.2 (2010) in which the CPs adopted the Assessment Framework for Scientific
Research Involving Ocean Fertilization (Assessment Framework) and stated their intent
for the Assessment Framework to meet the objectives of resolution LC-LP.1. 20 1
Resolution LC-LP.2 instructs the CPs to continue to use the "utmost caution" when using
the Assessment Framework to evaluate whether OIF activities constitute legitimate
scientific research.202 The resolution states the LC/LP's goal to "work towards providing
a global, transparent, and effective control and regulatory mechanism for ocean
fertilization activities," echoing language found in the CBD's Scientific Synthesis on
OIF.203 The resolution also emphasized the importance of consistent application of the
Assessment Framework among CPs.204 Finally, the resolution reaffirmed that OIF
activities failing to qualify as legitimate scientific research under the Assessment
Framework must fall within the definition of dumping and are thereby prohibited. After
years of consultation between the LC/LP and other international organizations and
hammering out legal principles, the newly completed Assessment Framework is the
culmination of the London Convention and London Protocol's work on ocean iron
fertilization.
B.

Structureof the Assessment Framework

The key players in the Assessment Framework include the applicants who submit
an OIF proposal for consideration; the Contracting Parties to the LC/LP (CPs), a term
that encompasses the governing body appointed by each CP to administer the
Assessment Framework; and the ultimate decision-maker appointed by the government
of the CP, who evaluates the completed Assessment Framework. 205 The language of the
Assessment Framework is permissive, as demonstrated by the pervasive use of the word
"should," indicating that CPs have considerable discretion in what to require of OIF
proposals and, to a degree, how to administer the evaluation. 2 06
The first step in the Assessment Framework evaluation is the Initial
Assessment.207 Every proposal must meet the threshold of having "proper scientific
attributes" that the applicant should submit to "scientific peer review," with no
implication of direct financial gain from the project. 208 Next, CPs submit the proposal to
200. For more details on the development of the Assessment Framework, see IMO, Draft Ocean Fertilization
Assessment Framework, submitted by the U.S. to the Scientific Groups of the London Convention and London
Protocol, Sess. 33/4, Apr. 19-23, 2010, IMO Doc. LC/SG 33/2/2 (Feb. 12, 2010) [hereinafter LC/SG 33/2/2];
IMO, Rep. of the Ist Meeting of the Intersessional Technical Working Group on Ocean Fertilization, Feb. 9-13,
2009, IMO Doc. LC/SG-C02 3/5 (Feb. 16, 2009).
201. LC-LP.2, supranote 83; Press Briefing, supranote 37; Gussow et al., supra note 158, at 14.
202. LC-LP.2, supranote 83.
203. Id. 5; SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS, supra note 80, at 5.
204. LC-LP.2, supranote 83.
205. Assessment Framework, supra note 83. For further discussion on the debate surrounding the term
"Contracting Party" to denote the competent body for carrying out the Assessment Framework, see LC/SG
33/2/2, supra note 200, at 2.
206. Assessment Framework, supranote 83.
207. Id. at 1.3.1, 2.
208. Id. at 1.3.1, 2.2.1-2.2.4. To clarify, "[t]his should not preclude payment for services rendered in support
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a rigorous review under the Environmental Assessment, which leads the CP in combing
through vast amounts of technical, scientific information that proposals should
provide.209 The section also acknowledges that, given the lack of scientific certainty in
the field of OIF, "gaps and uncertainties" are likely to exist and applicants should
identify them and explain how they plan to deal with them. 210 Under this section,
applicants submit a Problem Formulation that goes into meticulous detail about attributes
such as the location where the fertilization is to take place, a description of the iron
substance intended for release, and the anticipated movement of the substance as it
spreads throughout the waters. 2 11
The largest subsection of the Environmental Assessment - Risk Characterization
evaluates the applicant's Impact Hypothesis, which "provide[s] an estimate of the
likelihood of adverse impacts and the magnitude of those impacts."212 CPs use this
information to evaluate the potential risks that the proposed OIF activity poses to every
aspect of the ecosystem, such as effects on ocean waters due to new phytoplankton
blooms, changes in the ocean water's pH level, and increase in fish populations.213 The
applicant is responsible, should the CP require it, for determining a "baseline," or the
"state of the ecosystem" as it exists prior to receiving the fertilization. 2 14 The purpose of
the baseline is to allow for easier monitoring of changes caused by the OIF activity,
though such a baseline is difficult to establish due to the ever-fluctuating nature of the
ocean.215
Once the CPs have gathered this information, they are to plug it into some form of
"logic framework" to determine the level of magnitude and degree of likelihood of each
individual risk.216 They then must take the aggregate of those individual risk levels to
determine an "overall description of risk" for the entire proposed OIF project. 2 17 Each
CP may use the logic framework suggested in the Assessment Framework or choose its
preferred logic framework methodology to arrive at this overall risk determination.218
CPs must also address any uncertainties within the project that limit the accuracy of risk
conclusions once potential unknown factors are added in.219
Three final sections wrap up the Assessment Framework. The Risk Management
section contains precautionary preventive strategies and contingency plans to minimize
the environmental impact of the OIF project.220 The Decision Making section discusses,
foreseeably, that CPs should disallow OIF projects deemed unacceptably risky and allow

of the
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
3.5.7.

experiment or future financial impacts of patented technology." Id. at 2.2.2.
Id. at 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4.
See, e.g., Assessment Framework, supranote 83, at 3.1.3.2.
Id. at 3.1.2.
Id. at 3.5.1.
Assessment Framework, supra note 83, at 3.5.2.
Id. at 3.5.5. The applicant may gather data from existing scientific literature or "targeted surveys." Id. at

215.

See SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS, supranote 80, at 50.

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Assessment Framework, supra note 83, at 3.5.12.
Id. at 3.5.12.
Id. at 3.5.12.1.
Id. at 3.5.13.
Id. at 3.6.1, 3.6.5.
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only those projects that they deem legitimate scientific research.221 Finally, the Results
of Monitoring section encourages the communication of results from applying the
Assessment Framework, as well as the outcomes of OIF experiments.222 Importantly,
this section gives CPs the right to modify or revoke authorization of OIF activities at any
time, which implies that all permits issued, even after satisfying the Assessment
Framework, remain provisional. 223
C.

Concerns with the Assessment Framework
1.

Potential for Inconsistent Application

Resolution LC-LP.2 expressed the need for consistent application of the
Assessment Framework.224 However, with so few OIF experiments completed to date
and little to no precedent to compare to new proposals, every time a CP uses the
Assessment Framework to evaluate an OIF project, it will constitute a sort of de novo
review.225 Precedents for evaluation will likely be a long time in coming because CPs
will apply the Assessment Framework on a case-by-case basis to potentially widely
differing proposals.226 This lack of precedent may lead to inconsistent application of the
Assessment Framework, despite the desire expressed in LC-LP.2 for consistent
application.227
Given its permissive language allowing individual CPs significant discretion in, for
example, determining what they require in proposals and establishing their own logic
framework for risk assessment, evaluation under the Assessment Framework could lead
to polar opposite decisions among CPs about what constitutes legitimate scientific
research.228 Considering the differing views taken by the two German ministries who
evaluated the LOHAFEX proposal, it does not stretch the imagination to foresee similar
inconsistent application. 229
Some have suggested that an international organization assist in the OIF project
evaluations using the Assessment Framework, as certain nations may have limited
capacity to implement it effectively.230 It seems that the LC/LP could easily dispatch a
team of experts to bolster the CPs' scientific understanding of OIF and assist in assessing
the technical aspects of the proposals. Additionally, resolution LC-LP.2 itself emphasizes
the importance of consultation among CPs using the Assessment Framework and that
sharing the results of its application would "facilitate consistency in its application."231 it

221. Assessment Framework, supranote 83, at 4.3.
222. Id. at 5.1, 5.2.
223. Id. at 5.3.
224. LC-LP.2, supra note 83, 4.
225. Abate & Greenlee, supranote 7, at 563.
226. LC-LP.2, supra note 83.
227. Id.
2.2, 3.5.12.1.
228. See Assessment Framework, supra note 83,
229. Abate & Greenlee, supra note 7, at 557-58.
230. IMO, Ocean Fertilization:Mitigating EnvironmentalImpacts of Future Scientific Research, submitted
by Canada to the Scientific Groups of the London Convention and London Protocol, Extraordinary Sess., Oct.
7-8, 2010, 2, IMO Doc. LC/SG/ES.INF.4 (July 30, 2010).
231. LC-LP.2, supranote 83.
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is up to the CPs to follow this suggestion in order for such communication to achieve this
goal. It seems reasonable for the LC-LP to require such reporting among its CPs. The
team of experts dispatched to assist with the project evaluations could aid the CPs by
performing a reporting function during and after the Assessment Framework evaluation
and after the completion of the experiment.
2.

Risk of Manipulation of the Information

Applicants know the pervasive uncertainty of the effects of OIF projects; they also
know that the less risky their proposals appear, the more likely they are to gain approval.
Though one could legitimately assume that the majority of OIF applicants will submit
proposals with the best of intentions, there may be room in the Assessment Framework
for manipulation of information by those who understand how to take advantage of
uncertainties and the inexperience of the CPs who will appraise their proposals. For
example, the Assessment Framework states that applicants should provide information
about the proposed region where they will place the iron, predictions of how much the
iron will spread, and finally, a predicted region of impact.232 Due to natural fluctuation
of conditions that applicants cannot control, it may be difficult for them to make accurate
predictions.233 It may be possible for applicants to underestimate purposely their areas of
impact to make their proposal seem less risky; then, should the area of impact shift or
grow larger than predicted, applicants could chalk up their incorrect prediction to
uncontrollable circumstances. Applicants who have an eye toward performing OIF
research with hopes of profiting from OIF at some point down the road may have
incentive to manipulate the information at the end of their experiment by overstating the
success of their results. 234
The risk of manipulation increases due to the CPs' lack of experience with
assessing OIF projects and, indeed, with OIF itself. The Assessment Framework
encourages the use of "scientific peer review" and monitoring plans. 23 5 Language that
required such peer review of proposals and monitoring throughout the stages of the
Assessment Framework would create stronger protection against manipulation of
information. 23 6 The LC/LP could assist by providing a team of observers to monitor the
experiment, comparing the predictions to what actually happens, and to give researchers
incentive not to exaggerate the results of their projects. 2 37
3.

Heavy Burden on Small-Scale Applicants

The Assessment Framework's purpose and design is to limit OIF activities to
legitimate scientific research and to bar large-scale, commercial OIF. However, the
massive amount of information that the Assessment Framework requests may prove too
stringent and burdensome for qualified scientists of even the most legitimate OIF

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Assessment Framework, supra note 83, at 3.2.4, Fig. 2.
Alsopp et al., supranote 45, at 7; Powell, Lessons from Nature, supra note 43, at 2-3.
Abate & Greenlee, supranote 7, at 595-96.
Assessment Framework, supra note 83, at 2.2.3, 3.6.6.
See Abate & Greenlee, supranote 7, at 594.
Id. at 595-96.
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scientific research project.238 Members of the Working Group on Ocean Fertilization
discussed setting a "threshold" under which small-scale projects would have a lower bar
for satisfying the Assessment Framework; the assumption was that smaller-scale projects
constitute a lower degree of risk, and therefore could be on a fast track assessment
process.239 Members who opposed the threshold exception pointed out that small-scale
projects will inherently need less documentation than larger projects and that applicants
will naturally address "the key elements of the guidelines" "to a degree appropriate to the
project." 240
Drafts of the Assessment Framework originally included language indicating that
Framework could strike some sort of balance between the level of risk of
Assessment
the
an OIF activity and level of effort required for its evaluation.241 However, given the
limited amount of knowledge about OIF, and the fact that small-scale does not
necessarily equate with low-risk, the Working Group cut that language from the final
Assessment Framework.242 Despite the decision to leave out such language in the initial
Assessment Framework, the CPs have asked the Scientific Groups to provide guidance at
243
future meetings on the possibility of establishing such a threshold exception.
D. Does the Assessment Frameworkmeet the objectives of resolutionLC-LP. 1
(2008)?
Two of the primary objectives stated in resolution LC-LP. 1 were the limitation of
OIF activities to legitimate scientific research and the development of an assessment
framework to aid in determining whether an OIF proposal compliments or contravenes
the aims of the London Convention and London Protocol. 244 The Assessment
Framework is a substantial achievement in satisfying both objectives.
Resolution LC-LP.1 marked the emergence of the legitimate scientific research
doctrine for OIF projects. The Assessment Framework provides CPs with the means for
defining what OIF activities qualify as such research. No doubt the definition is a lengthy
one, but the nature of OIF necessitates flexibility with so many possible permutations of
factors from proposal to proposal. Resolution LC-LP. I acknowledges this need where it
states that the legitimacy of the scientific research "should be defined as those proposals
that have been assessed and found acceptable under the assessment framework" on a
case-by-case basis.245 Hence, CPs need multi-faceted, adjustable standards by which to
define legitimate scientific OIF research. Despite its copious and meticulously detailed
information requirements, the Assessment Framework remains accessible and supplies
clearly delineated steps for applicants to follow in developing their proposals and for CPs
238. Gissow et al., supra note 158, at 14.
239. IMO, Draft Assessment Frameworkfor Scientific Research Involving Ocean Fertilization,submitted by
the Chairman of the Correspondence Group to the Scientific Groups of the London Convention and London
6, IMO Doc. LC/SG/ES.2 (July 30, 2010) [hereinafter
Protocol, Extraordinary Sess., Oct. 7-8, 2010,
LC/SG/ES.2]
240. Id. 17.
241. Id. at Annex 1, 2; Annex 2, 2.
242. Id. 17.
243. Id. 111.2.
244. LC-LP.1, supra note 148.
245. Id.
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to follow in crafting case-specific definitions of legitimate scientific research.
In its call for an OIF assessment framework, resolution LC-LP.1 states the
importance of "tools for determining whether the proposed activity is contrary to the
aims" of the LC/LP. 246 For London Convention members, the Assessment Framework
provides guidelines for controlling OIF as a potential source of marine pollution by
making sure the projects that go forward qualify as legitimate scientific research.247 By
serving as a bar to large-scale, commercial OIF projects, which pose the greatest threat
of deleterious effects and, thus, of marine pollution, the Assessment Framework assists
London Convention members in preventing pollution that occurs from dumping
wastes.248 Members of the London Protocol must meet the somewhat stricter
requirement to "prevent, reduce and where practicable eliminate pollution by
dumping." 249 The Assessment Framework helps Protocol members in meeting this
objective. Theoretically, by following these guidelines, absolutely no OIF project that
would result in pollution would receive permission to take place. Extensive though the
provisions may be, if CPs pay proper attention to the details, it would be difficult for an
OIF project that fails to meet the requirements of legitimate scientific research to slip
through the cracks. When CPs of both the London Convention and London Protocol put
forth the effort to effectively use all that the Assessment Framework offers for OIF
project evaluation, they will take affirmative steps toward the LC/LP's objectives of
promoting the protection of the oceans.250
E.

Does the Assessment Framework meet the objectives of resolution LC-LP.2 (2010)?

In resolution LC-LP.2, the CPs emphasized their commitment to continued work
"towards providing a global, transparent, and effective control and regulatory mechanism
for ocean fertilization activities .

. .251

This phrasing echoes language stated by the

CBD; the LC-LP also acknowledged this aim in resolution LC-LP. 1.252 This linguistic
parallel may indicate an attempt among international organizations to harmonize their
stances on OIF, so it is important for OIF regulation under the LC/LP to work toward
meeting these standards.
At first glance, the LC/LP does not have truly global reach as it only legally binds
States who are party to it.253 However, between the two of them, the London Convention
and London Protocol bind 125 nations, including some that are most likely to receive
OIF proposals, such as Australia, U.K., U.S., and nations within the E.U.254 Moreover,
since the Assessment Framework provides an accessible, clearly delineated evaluation
246. Id.
247. London Convention, supranote 146, at art. 1.
248. Id.
249. London Protocol, supra note 146, at art. 2.
250. Id.
251. LC-LP.2, supra note 83.
252. SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS, supra note 80, at 5; Convention on Biological Diversity, COP 10 draft Decision
10.L36, supra note 125; LC-LP.1, supra note 148.
253. Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 94, at 230.
254. London Convention and Protocol, IMO, http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/SpecialProgram
mesAndlnitiatives/Pages/London-Convention-and-Protocol.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2010); IMO, Status of
the London Convention and Protocol, Sess. 30/3, Oct. 27-30, 2008, IMO Doc. 30/2 (Oct. 2, 2008).
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process, it is likely to gain credibility among nations who are not party to the LC/LP as a
basic format for OIF evaluation. Finally, the Assessment Framework is likely to
eventually set international norms and standards that will lead to consistent governance
of OIF globally 255
By directly addressing the pervasive uncertainties inherent in OIF experiments, the
Assessment Framework contributes to the level of transparency needed to regulate OIF.
LOHAFEX researchers merely made vague claims of compliance with international law;
with no framework to assess LOHAFEX's statements more thoroughly, the German
government decided that these claims sufficed. 256 The Assessment Framework,
however, promotes full disclosure of the uncertainties, assumptions, and gaps in data in
OIF proposals, providing the sort of transparency needed to determine whether an OIF
project is, in fact, legitimate scientific research. 257
The effectiveness of the Assessment Framework will be easier to determine once it
has seen some action. It certainly provides a means for meticulous evaluation of OIF
proposals. However, certain conclusions of the CBD's Scientific Synthesis on OIF could
cast doubt on the effectiveness of several Assessment Framework provisions. 25 8
First, Scientific Synthesis cites the difficulty of establishing "baselines against
which any short- or long-term changes and impacts resulting from [OIF] activities could
be measured or monitored." 2 59 The Assessment Framework intends for applicants to
describe this kind of baseline in their Impact Hypothesis and then devotes an entire
section to predicting such short- and long-term effects assessments.260 The Assessment
Framework also asks applicants to "discuss the implications of limited knowledge" of
baseline conditions in relation to their experiment, but they may not concretely know, or
even have the capacity to know, what those implications might be. 26 1 This lack of
information limits the effectiveness of these provisions, though their effectiveness may
increase concurrently once CPs begin compiling results of OIF experiments.
Lack of scientific knowledge in OIF similarly limits the effectiveness of other
Assessment Framework provisions. The Scientific Synthesis points out that "the impact
on biological processes and marine biodiversity is . . . difficult to forecast," yet the

Assessment Framework requests applicants predict them in their Impact Hypothesis. 26 2
The "extent and duration of the impact caused by [OIF] . .. can only be estimated," yet
OIF proposals are judged for riskiness based on these very factors. 2 63
While these conclusions point out inherent weaknesses in certain Assessment

255. See Victor, supra note 18, at 3.
256. Abate & Greenlee, supranote 7, at 586.
257. Assessment Framework, supranote 83, at 3.5.13.
258. SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS, supra note 80, at 50-51. Although the LC/LP is still considering how it will use
the CBD's study, given the LC/LP's acknowledgement of the CBD's views on OIF, the Scientific Synthesis is
likely to influence the continued development of regulation. Development of Science, supra note 182, at 2. See
also LC-LP. 1, supra note 148; LC-LP.2, supra note 83 (citing language echoed in the Scientific Synthesis of
"global, transparent, and effective" regulation of OIF.)
259. See SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIs, supra note 80, at 50.
260. Assessment Framework, supra note 83, at 3.4.
261. Id. at 3.3.
262. Id. at 3.4. See SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS, supranote 80, at 50.
263. Id. at 3.5.9. See SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS, supra note 80, at 50-51.
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Framework provisions, they also indicate that the provisions' effectiveness will likely
strengthen as the CPs allow legitimate scientific OIF research projects to proceed. As the
scientific knowledge base grows, applicants will be able to provide increasingly accurate
predictions about what will happen during OIF experiments and the resulting effects. The
key is for CPs to recognize the limitations placed on applicants by a lack of scientific
knowledge about OIF and to make their decisions in light of what applicants have the
reasonable capacity to know. It would be extremely problematic if CPs disapproved of
OIF projects because they viewed the applicants' inability to make solid predictions as a
failure to meet the Assessment Framework's provisions. If that happened, then the
Assessment Framework's own provisions would destroy its objectives by prohibiting
legitimate scientific OIF research. However, if CPs recognize these limitations, place
realistic expectations on applicants, and allow legitimate scientific research OIF projects
to proceed, despite uncertainties, then the Assessment Framework will effectively satisfy
OIF regulation objectives.
F.

The Effect of the Assessment Framework on OIF as a GeoengineeringStrategy

Although OIF is not currently a valid geoengineering strategy, no one has come
remotely close to conclusively disproving its potential to combat climate change. On the
one hand, the LC/LP's Assessment Framework has brought OIF under its protection in
the context of legitimate scientific research, thereby protecting its potential as a future
geoengineering technique. On the other hand, the same legal instrument has presently
relegated OIF as a geoengineering method to the backburner.
Critics of OIF as a geoengineering method should find the Assessment Framework
a satisfactory step toward controlling OIF by limiting its operation to legitimate scientific
research. In its recent call for a ban on geoengineering, the CBD appeared to demonstrate
trust in the LC/LP's work on OIF regulation, which seemed to save OIF from getting
lumped in with the other banned geoengineering activities.264 The LC/LP's regulation
through the Assessment Framework has served to legitimize OIF as a field of research by
separating it from the context of geoengineering. While simultaneously legitimizing OIF
research, the regulation has stigmatized OIF as a geoengineering method for the present.
Resolution LC-LP. 1 affirmed the LC/LP's concern with the large-scale ocean
fertilization generally associated with geoengineering.265 The Assessment Framework
does not specifically disallow large-scale OIF, but it does ask CPs to consider scale in
their decision, noting that, "[i]n general, risk increases with . . . the size of the area over
which [OIF] occurs."266 In addition, by stating that "[tihere should not be any financial
and/or economic gain arising directly from the experiment or its outcomes" the
Assessment Framework is likely to block the kind of large-scale commercial projects
with a view toward carbon trading that raised concern among opponents to OIF. 267
264. Eilperin, supra note 35.
265. Id.; LC-LP.1, supra note 148.
266. Assessment Framework, supranote 83, at 3.5.14.
267. Id. at 2.2.2. Earlier drafts of the Assessment Framework used more direct language against commercial
OIF, stating, "[T]here is no scientific basis for pursuing ocean fertilization activities with the expectation that
carbon credits, deferments, or offsets could be issued . . . Thus, there should be no direct financial gain for
either carbon sequestration or fisheries enhancement for the organization responsible for the experiment . .. it
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Stigmatization or not, no one can see the future of OIF's development. Although
LC/LP
regulations block OIF as a geoengineering method now, they also keep the
the
possibility of OIF as future geoengineering strategy alive by allowing continued
research. The door is open for unanticipated results from some future legitimate
scientific OIF research experiment that could change the game for OIF as a method
geoengineering. Given its potential to affect the entire global population, one
geoengineering skeptic stated, "geoengineering proposals should receive detailed,
precautionary scrutiny" under "sophisticated legal instruments and implementation
systems."268 Should OIF become a valid geoengineering method, the Assessment
Framework foreshadows the likelihood of effective international regulation of the
activity. Not only will its provisions help establish international norms for conducting
OIF experiments now, but the international bodies that would seek to control OIF as a
geoengineering method would not have to start from scratch in developing adequate
regulations.
The LC/LP stated their intent to continue refining the Assessment Framework,
both at the next scheduled meeting in Montreal, Canada in June 2011 and as they learn of
developments in the science of OIF. 269 Given its commitment to leaming about all
aspects of ocean iron fertilization, should OIF eventually show true potential for
geoengineering without the associated risks, the LC/LP will certainly reconsider its
regulations.
V.

CONCLUSION

The London Convention and London Protocol have taken substantial and
commendable steps toward international regulation of ocean iron fertilization. As the
LC/LP decide on a legally binding option to bring OIF officially within their scope, the
new Assessment Framework will give effect to their objective of limiting OIF to
legitimate scientific research. The Assessment Framework thoroughly covers all the
bases of inquiry into OIF research. Although the general lack of knowledge surrounding
OIF limits the full effectiveness of some of its provisions, it would appear that their
effectiveness will strengthen as Contracting Parties use the Assessment Framework to
permit legitimate scientific research. Although the LC/LP's reach is limited to its own
Contracting Parties, it is likely to establish international norms and standards for the
regulation of OIF. The move toward global, transparent, and effective international OIF
regulation is progressing steadily, with the London Convention and London Protocol
standing competently at the helm.
-Melissa Eick
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preclude activities such as sale of carbon credits from the experiment." LC/SG/ES.2, supra note 239, at
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